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FEDERAL CIVIL ACTION AGAINST PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
FOR CRIMES INVOLVING CIVIL RIGHTS
RAcIAL violence by individuals and by private groups such as the Ku Klux
Klan constitutes a serious obstacle to the Negro drive for equality. In order to
assert their newly-won legal rights Negroes must be able to assemble and or-
ganize, free from violence. Federal protection of civil rights, however, is de-
signed primarily to cope with violence and discrimination involving govern-
ment participation or "state action,"' not private violence or discrimination,
The one exception is Section 241 of Title 18 of the United States Code which
makes criminal conspiracies to deprive citizens of certain federal rights.2 Un-
fortunately, Section 241 has not been effective. Among the difficulties in apply-
ing this section are the requirement of specific intent 8 and the reluctance of
1. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958) and 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958)1
imposing criminal and civil liabilities, respectively, on any person who deprives another
of his civil rights "under color of" state or local law or custom.
2. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to hint
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same; or
If tvo or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege so secured -
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both.
Rev. Stat § 5508 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958).
Section 241 has been held to protect those rights "which arise from the relationship
of the individual and the Federal Government" and which "flow from the substantive
powers" of that government. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 77, 78 (1951).
Among such rights are:
the right to vote for federal officials, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884);
the right to enjoy privileges under the homestead laws, United States v. Waddell,
112 U.S. 76 (1884) ;
the right to protection while in the custody of a federal officer, Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) ;
the right to inform federal officials of violations of federal laws, In re Quarles, 158
U.S. 532 (1895) ;
the right to testify before a federal agency, Foss v. United States, 266 Fed. 881 (9th
Cir. 1920).
Other rights of "national" citizenship, presumably protected by § 241, include the
right of assembly for national purposes, United States v. Crinkshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)
(dictum), Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), and the right to travel from state to
state, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 177 (concurring opinion) (1941). See discussion in United States v. Williams, 341
U.S. 70 (1951).
3. The prevailing interpretation of § 241 is that given in Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945), in which the Court required that, to sustain a federal conviction
under § 241, the offender must have "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right made definite by decision or other rule of law." Id. at 103. The offender must have
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southern juries to convict. As a consequence of these difficulties, and because
of the Justice Department's reluctance to prosecute unless there is a probability
of conviction,4 there have been few prosecutions. State law is equally ineffec-
tive in coping with private violence. Community pressures upon state and local
prosecutors often prevent them from prosecuting in any but the most widely
publicized racial crimes. Even when publicity from "outside" forces a prose-
cution, local juries often refuse to convict. Short of new legislation, increased
protection of civil rights from private violence must come from the possible
reinterpretation and expansion of existing statutes. This Note explores one
possibility: a federal civil action against private individuals.
Section 1985(3) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides, in part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in dis-
guise on the highway.., for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ....
... If one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done,
any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another
is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so in-jured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occa-
sioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the con-
spirators.5
As a civil action for damages, Section 1985(3) would have advantages over
Section 241, its criminal counterpart. First, control over initiation of the suit
would rest with the party rather than with the prosecutor. Admittedly, the
desirability of party control is subject to argument. In recent years the Justice
Department has been reluctant to initiate criminal prosecutions under Section
241 because the Department felt that a large number of unsuccessful prosecu-
tions would generate contempt for the civil rights statutes." But complete
failure to implement existing legislation is likely to generate even more con-
tempt for the law than would unsuccessful prosecutions. And even unsuccess-
ful lawsuits may have an educative and therapeutic effect upon the community
by publicizing lawless conduct. Perhaps such publicity would stir responsible
southerners to curb the violence of lawless elements in their own community.
In addition, prosecutions or civil suits which fail because of defects in our
present judicial system - for example, the failure of all-white juries to con-
vict, traceable in part to discriminatory selection procedures 7 - are important
known or should lmve known that he was depriving his victim of a constitutional right.
This requirement has led to great confusion in the minds of judges, jurors and litigants
alike. Recent attempts by the Department of Justice to obtain a clarification have failed.
See 1961 UNrrED STATES COu'eN ON CIVIL RIGHTS R PoaR (Book 5), 45-52.
4. Id. at 63. Another related problem is that United States Attorneys are sometimes
more responsive to local pressures than to directions from Washington. Id. at 64.
5. Rev. Stat. § 1980(3) (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1958).
6. See 1961 U-rrza STATES Comme'x oN Civir. RIGHTs R wRo (Book 5), 63.
7. Id., ch. 7.
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in focusing attention on these defects and on the need for reform. Finally, liti-
gation forces the offender to prepare and pay for a legal defense; he must
hire counsel, submit to discovery, appear in court, and perhaps have his prop-
erty attached. It may be that the "nuisance" value of the litigation constitutes
an effective deterrent to private violence.8 As long as the Justice Department
continues to use the probability of conviction standard, party control of the suit
is desirable. 9 Second, unlike a criminal prosecution, no specific intent need be
proved under Section 1985(3).10 The elimination of this requirement consid-
erably enhances the chances of success in the civil action. And, third, the civil
nature of Section 1985(3) should ease the problem of obtaining relief from
those southern juries which are biased. Juries may be more willing to exact
damages from a defendant than subject him to a prison sentence and the stigma
of a criminal conviction."'
However desirable Section 1985(3) may seem as an additional legal deter-
rent to racial violence, the Supreme Court decision in Collins v. Hardyinan 12
presents a serious stumbling block to its effective use. The rights protected by
1985 (3), in part, are defined as the right to be free of conspiracies whose pur-
pose is to deprive any person "of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws." This definition is capable of a broad
interpretation and seemingly could afford protection against private violence.
However, the Supreme Court in the Collins case interpreted the clause re-
strictively and, in effect, confined its application to instances involving "state
action" or the complete breakdown of state law enforcement.
Collins involved members of a Los Angeles Democratic Club who held a
meeting to discuss a proposal condemning the Marshall Plan. The Club in-
8. It is assumed that groundless suits would not be brought merely for harassment
purposes. State law could supply adequate protection against such conduct.
9. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has criticized the Justice Depart-
ment for attaching exclusive value to the "success" factor. 1961 UNITED STATES COMW'X
ON CnvL RIGHTS REPORT (Book 5), 63. For a more detailed criticism of the probability
of conviction standard and discussion of the need for more lawsuits, see Note, 74 YAuX
L.J. 1297 (1965).
10. In construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil remedy directed toward state action that
is similar to § 1985(3), the Supreme Court noted the absence of any requirement of
"wilfulness" in that statute and held that no specific intent need be proved to sustain a
civil claim. The Court stated that the section "should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). Compare the treatment of "specific intent" In
Screws v. United States, stepra note 2.
11. In many instances a civil action will accomplish results when a criminal prosecu-
tion will not, because a jury which might be reluctant to convict a defendant in a
criminal prosecution for a violation of civil rights might not hesitate to afford
relief in the form of a civil penalty.
To Secure These Rights, REPORT OF THE PREsIDENT's CoMLr. ON CVIL RIGHTS 130 (1947).
See also Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of Justice, 1 BxIL oF
RIGHTS Rxv. 206, 216 (1941).
12. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
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tended to forward its condemnation, in the form of a petition for the redress
of grievances, to the appropriate federal officials. The defendants, members of
the American Legion, used force to break up the meeting. Plaintiffs sued un-
der 1985(3) alleging that the Legionnaires had conspired for the purpose of
depriving plaintiffs of equal privileges and immunities by depriving them of
their right to assemble and petition the government. The District Court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss 13 on the ground that the complaint failed to
show "state action." The Court of Appeals reversed, 14 holding that no showing
of "state action" was necessary. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Jackson, affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint.
Justice Jackson, in analyzing Section 1985(3) declared that it fell into two
parts: the first defining punishable conspiracies and the second describing the
overt acts required to make the conspiracy actionable. He assumed, without
deciding, that plaintiffs met the overt act requirement because they had been
deprived of "having and exercising a federal right."1 5l But the overt act must
be in furtherance of the "very limited" conspiracies defined in the act. These
conspiracies must be
for the purpose of depriving ... [any person] of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immnities under the law.10
Justice Jackson then argued that the conspiracies defined by Section 1985(3)
included the element of state action:
The only inequality suggested is that the defendants broke up plaintiffs'
meeting and did not break up meetings of others with whose sentiments
they agreed. To be sure, this is not equal injury, but it is no more a
deprivation of "equal protection" or of "equal privileges and immunities"
than it would be for one to assault one neighbor without assaulting them
all .... Such private discrimination is not inequality before the law tonless
there is some inanipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or
sanctuary for doing so. Plaintiffs' rights were certainly invaded, disre-
garded and lawlessly violated, but neither their rights nor their equality
of rights under the law have been, or were intended to be, denied or im-
pairedY *
Jackson conceded that some private conspiracies could be of such magnitude
as to come within the statute:
We do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be of such
magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal protection of the
laws or equal privileges and immunities under laws. Indeed, the post-
Civil War Ku Klux Klan ... was able effectively to deprive Negroes of
13. Hardyman v. Collins, 80 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
14. Hardyman v. Collins, 183 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1950).
-15. 341 U.S. at 660.
16. Ibid. (Emphasis in original.)
17. Although he did not base the decision upon it, Jackson also noted "in passing"
the argument derived from the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that an individual
cannot deprive anyone of his constitutional rights, though he may invade or violate those
rights. Id. at 661 (Emphasis added).
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their legal rights and to close all avenues of redress or vindication ...
But here nothing of that sort appears. We have a case of lawless political
brawl, precipitated by a handful of white citizens against other white citi-
zens. California courts are open to plaintiffs and its laws offer redress for
their injury and vindication for their rights.1 s
And he concluded that:
We say nothing of the power of Congress to authorize such Civil actions
as respondents have commenced or otherwise to redress such grievances
as they assert. We think that Congress has not, in the narrow class of
conspiracies defined by this statute, included the conspiracy charged here.1"
The opinion fails to satisfy inquiry. The essence of Jackson's argument is
that while Congress may give a right of action against individuals who con-
spire to interfere with certain federal rights, it did not do so because, as the
lower District Court more succinctly stated, "[T]he qualifying word 'equal'
[in the statute] presupposes state action. '20 But this reasoning is purely con-
ceptual. Although it is certainly tenable to construe the words of the statute
to mean "state action," such a construction is by no means compelled. The
words "equal protection" of the laws or "equal privileges and immunities" are,
after all, abstract. The Court of Appeals and the dissent in Collins read these
words to reach private action.21 And in United States v. Harris,=2 the Supreme
Court construed identical language as directed "exclusively against the action
of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their adminis-
tration by its officers...." Since the language alone could lead to either con-
clusion the failure of the Court in Collins to make any inquiry into the legis-
lative history of Section 1985(3) is disappointing. In fact, the inquiry would
have revealed that the statute was aimed at acts of private individuals as well
as public officials.
18. Id. at 662.
19. Ibid.
20. 80 F. Supp. at 506.
21. The language of the statute refutes the suggestion that action under color of
state law is a necessary ingredient of the cause of action which it recognizes.
R.S. § 1980(3) speaks of "two or more persons in any State or Territory" con-
spiring. That clause is not limited to state officials. Still more obviously where the
section speaks of persons going "in disguise upon the highway . . . for the purpose
of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws," it certainly does not limit its reference to actions of that kind by state offlcials.
When Congress, at this period, did intend to limit comparable civil rights legisla-
tion to action under color of state law, it said so in unmistakable terms. In fact,
RS. § 1980(3) originally was § 2 of the Act of April 20, 1871, and § I of that
same Act said "That any person who, under color of any law . . . subject(s] ...
any person ... to the deprivation of any rights, . . . secured by the Constitution
of the United States, shall . . . be liable to the party injured ... " (emphasis
added) 17 STAT. 13.
341 U.S. at 663-64 (Burton, J. dissenting). See also Collins v. Hardyman, 183 F.2d 308,
311-12 (9th Cir. 1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
22. 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882).
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Section 1985(3) was enacted in reaction to the wave of Klan terror then
sweeping the South.2 As introduced, the bill did not speak in terms of "equal"
protection or "equal" privileges and immunities:
If two or more persons shall, ... conspire, or combine together to do any
act in violation of the rights, privileges, or iminmunities of any person, to
which he is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
which, committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, would under any law of the United States then in
force, constitute- the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, rob-
bery, assault and battery.. ; [they]-... shall be... guilty of a felony.2
The amendment that added the qualifying word "equal" (and also the civil
damage provisions) came later, as an artful compromise between three differ-
ent groups. Each of these groups agreed that the legislation should reach pri-
vate action, but differed in the scope of the conduct they wished to prohibit.
The first group wanted to protect these rights of federal citizenship arising
out of the relationship between the citizens and the federal government and
which flow from the inherent powers and existence of the federal govern-
ment.25 This group distinguished these rights from rights the Constitution
merely guaranteed against state infringement under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Presumably, Congress could protect the former rights against private
infringement. 26 The distinction between these two sets of rights has been de-
veloped subsequent to the debates.27 Such rights of federal citizenship include,
among others, the right to pass freely from state to state, the right to petition
Congress for a redress of grievances, the right to vote for national officers, and
the right to be protected against violence while in the lawful custody of a
'United States Marshall.s At the time section 1985(3) was debated, though,
these rights had not yet been judicially established, and it is not clear what
Congress thought were the rights of national citizenship.20 The debates suggest,
23. Section 1985(3) was originally part of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871. 17
Stat 13 (1871).
24. Co Nd. GLOBi, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 317 (1871) (einphasis added) (hereinafter
cited as GLOBE).
25. It appears that those members of Congress who believed they were protecting
national rights fell into two sub-groups: those who believed that the provision of the
fourteenth amendment declaring "all persons born or naturalized in the United States
are citizens thereof" gave Congress power to directly protect national rights, and those
who believed Congress could protect the rights of national citizenship without relying
on the fourteenth amendment For the views of the former see GLOBE, 475-76 (Remarks of
Rep. Dawes); Id., Appendix, 83-85 (Remarks of Rep. Bingham). For the views of the
latter, see Id. at 382-83 (Remarks of. Rep. Hawley). The floor leader, Rep. Shellabarger,
equivocated between the two positions. Id. at 382, 478, Appendix at 69.
26. See debates cited note 25 supra.
27. Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
28. See cases cited at note 2 supra.
29. Except for Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
30. Examples of national rights that were cited during the debates included:
The right to travel interstate; the right to express opinions on "all subjects which
are not against the good order of the Government"; "a right to have his [a citizen's]
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though, that the members of the first group believed the rights to be broader 1
than the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation in the Slalighter-House
Cases 32 and in subsequent cases. 33
The second group went further than the first by arguing that Congress
should legislate directly against individual deprivation of fourteenth amend-
ment rights when anarchy rendered the state helpless to enforce its own laws.8
4
In these situations, the state denied the individual "rights, privileges, and im-
munities" under the fourteenth amendment. The third group argued for an
even broader extension of federal power. They would have effectively displaced
state authority over law enforcement, asserting that the fourteenth amend-
ment empowered Congress to set up a supervening federal jurisdiction over
the acts of individuals.3 5 The position of this last group presented difficulties
for the floor manager of the bill. Some of the sympathetic Republicans objected
to the bill as introduced because they feared that it embodied the views of this
group. By enumerating the specific crimes that could be punished if done "in
violation of the rights, privileges, and immunities" of an individual, the bill's
effect would be to "extend the [United States] criminal code over all the
States of this Union."
36
The sponsors of the bill therefore, amended the language with three ends in
mind. To accommodate all three factions, 7 the floor leader had to protect the
"fundamental" rights of national citizenship. At the insistence of the second
and third groups, they had to frame the amendment in such a way that four-
teenth amendment rights would be protected in cases of complete state break-
down. And finally, to answer the supporters' objections, they had to do both in
language that would not completely override state enforcement of its laws.
Introducing the amendment, Representative Shellabarger, the floor leader,
explained cryptically why the qualifying word "equal" had been added:
The change which the amendment proposes to make in section two of tile
original bill as reported by the committee, so far as it relates to disputed
grounds, so far as it is not confined to infractions of right which are clearly
case tried within a United States Federal court [which] has jurisdiction"; and a right
to support and advocate the election of any qualified person to any [federal] office. GLOBE,
382 (remarks of Rep. Hawley); Id. at 486 (remarks of Rep. Cook).
31. Debates cited note 25 supra. Some Congressmen, who talked in terms of the
"rights, privileges, and immunities of the American citizen," envisaged them as including
the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Id. at 475 (reMarks of Rep. Dawes).
32. Note 28 supra.
33. See note 3 supra.
34. GLOBE, 607-08 (remarks of Rep. Pool) ; Id. at 485 (remarks of Rep. Cook). The
debates suggest that the second group agreed with the first that Congress could also pro-
tect, in stable as well as in "anarchic" periods, the rights of "national citizenship." Id. at
485-87 (remarks of Rep. Cook); in any event, when Rep. Shellabarger introduced the
compromise amendment (see note 37 infra) he was bidding for support from both groups.
Id. at 478.
35. Id. at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) ; id. at 487 (remarks of Rep. Tyner).
36. Id. at 382.
37. See note 35 supra.
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independent of the 14th amendment, referable to and clcarlJ, sustainable
by the old provisions of the Constitution, is to be found in those portions
of the section which are contained in the part beginning at line twenty-
five, I think....
The object of the amendment is ... to confine the authority of this law to
the prevention of deprivations which attack the equality of rights of
American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect
of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy
equality of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens' rights shall
be within the scope of the remedies of this section3s
Shellabarger's is an explicit statement that, in changing the wording of the
clause to "equal," there was no intent to exclude protection of the rights of
national citizenship. These rights are "dearly independent of the 14th amnend-
ment, referable and clearly sustainable by the old provisions of the Constitu-
tion." The change related to the "disputed grounds." Since all proponents
agreed that the rights incident to national citizenship could and should be pro-
tected, the "disputed grounds" can only refer to the division of opinion regard-
ing the extent of protection Congress could otherwise constitutionally afford
under the fourteenth amendment. Regarding the scope of protection of these
rights, the qualifying word "equal" was added to "confine the authority of this
law to the prevention of deprivations which attack the equality of rights of
American citizens."
The legislative history does not support Jackson's argument in Collins that
section 1985(3) reaches only conspiracies which dominate the state govern-
ment. 9 Certainly all of the bill's proponents supported this result. But this
argument misconceives the nature of the congressional compromise. The addi-
tion of the word "equal" was a term of limitation only in the sense that Con-
gress wished to avoid subverting the entire criminal jurisdiction of the states.
However, within the confines of this limitation, Congress wished to act to the
full extent of its constitutional power in order to satisfy the Radical Repub-
licans. Consequently, the somewhat vague references 40 to the rights "clearly
independent of the fourteenth amendment" and the "equality of rights of
American citizens" - allusions to national rights of federal citizenship - are
terms of expansion. However vague an exercise of congressional power this
may be, as a product of political bargaining, the compromise furnishes guide-
lines for an interpretation of 1985(3).
Justice Jackson's interpretation of 1985(3) appears too restrictive because
it ignores the expansive element in Congress' intent. A construction of 1985 (3)
which includes not only situations of anarchy, but which also protects funda-
mental rights of national citizenship, appears more consistent with the congres-
38. GLOBE, 478 (emphasis added). It is clear that Shellabarger, pointing at the
changed language, is referring to the portion concerning "equal protection and equal
privileges and immunities," because that is the only portion of the amendment that bears
any relation to the original Section 2.
39. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. The statutory construction argument
of the dissenters in Collins, see note 22 supra, does not fully meet this argument of Jackson's.
40. See Remarks of Rep. Shellabarger, text accompanying note 39 supra.
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sional compromise. Justice Jackson sought a narrow construction of 1985(3),
apparently to avoid "constitutional problems of the first magnitude... [includ-
ing] Congressional power under and apart from the fourteenth amendment,
the reserved power of the states, the content of rights derived from national as
distinguished from state citizenship. ' 41 But national rights have been defined
narrowly through the application of Section 241 in the course of nearly a
hundred years. 42
It might still be argued, however, that because the rights protected tinder
Section 241 remain somewhat unclear 43 and thus are potentially of much
broader scope, to allow a civil action may have the result of flooding the
federal courts with suits that should be left to the states. To be sure, unless
the rights protected under Section 1985 (3) are of broad enough scope to pro-
tect the main thrust of Negro organizational activity such as voter education
classes, mass meetings, and door to door canvassing, the statute will be of
limited utility. Existing law suggests that this type of organizational activity
could come under the category of a national right. In ex parte Yarbrough,44
the Supreme Court stated that the federal government "must have the power
to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and cor-
ruption." The rationale of Yarbrough indicates that congressional power over
voting, though limited to federal elections, extends to voter registration activ-
ity.45 A long line of cases implies that Congress may also protect the right of
41. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 659 (1951).
42. See notes 3 and 28 supra.
43. See 1 Em-'sou & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
74-79 (2d ed. 1958).
44. 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884).
45. The plaintiff in Yarbrough was a qualified voter. But the rationale of the de-
cision does not depend on his status. The court emphasized that the source of the power
to protect the voter arises by necessity; a government whose power depends upon the
consent of the governed has a duty to ensure
that he may exercise this right freely, and to protect him from violence while
so doing .... This duty does not arise solely from the interest of the party con-
cerned, but from the necessity of the government itself, that its service shall be
free from the adverse influence of force and fraud practiced on its agents, and
that the votes by which its members of Congress and its President are elected
shall be the free votes of the electors ...
Id. at 662 (Emphasis in original).
Thus, the legal status of the claimant (be he registered or unregistered) should not
determine the extent of the protection: it is the political process which must be protected,
Since registration is a necessary prerequisite to voting status, protection of the registra-
tion process is essential to a healthy body politic, deserving of the same protection as
the right to vote.
Protection from violent interference with the right to register is only a small extension
of the holding in Yarbrough. The harder question is the extent of the activity which can
be fairly characterized as "registration." Do voter registration workers have a right to
be free from violence while encouraging others to register? Are voter education classes,
mass meetings and the like part of the registration process? Under Yarbrough, the answer
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"its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and
to petition for a redress of grievances," 46 that is, the right of "speaking and
printing on subjects relating to [the national] government."4 1 Since the dis-
cussion at many mass meetings and gatherings connected with the Negro civil
rights movement invariably includes federal legislation of one kind or another,
1985(3) may provide a damage claim for violent interference with these meet-
ings.
Despite the fact that national rights may be interpreted broadly, Section
1985(3) should still be applied. An argument to the contrary ignores the fact
that some states seem unwilling to provide redress for the deprivation of fed-
eral rights, particularly the rights of activist groups in the civil rights move-
ment. Also if there is a flood of actions under 1985(3) which upsets the fed-
eral balance, Congress may always take remedial action. With these two points
in mind, the courts should be unwilling to vitiate a statute whose authors in-
tended to protect federal rights against individual violence.
would depend on what effect violent interference with the particular activity has on the
freedom of the political process; if it can be shown that the violence proximately inter-
feres with the expression of the will of the people, the Yarbrough rationale calls for pro-
tection from the violence. In United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (Sth Cir. 1961), ccrt.
denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962), the Court of Appeals granted the federal government's
request to enjoin a state criminal proceeding brought against a voter registration worker
for the purpose of intimidating Negroes who were attempting to register. Despite the
general policy limiting federal court enjoinment of state proceedings in order to avoid
conflict between the systems, the court held that voter registration activity was sufficiently
related to the free political process to deserve the same protection from irreparable
injury as the right to vote.
For the interesting claim that Yarbrouqh extends congressional power to state elections
as well as federal elections, see Note, 74 YA.E L.J. 1448 (1965).
46. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
47. Powe v. United States, 109 F2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
679 (1940). See also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 513 (1939); In re Quarles, 158 U.S.
532, 535 (1895) ; Presser v. Minois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886).
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